Taken from his ‘OF MODERN JEWISH THEOLOGY; (Herborne, 1694)’
Johann a Lent (1654–1696) was a German Reformed theologian and scholar who served as Professor of Church History, Hebrew, and Syriac at the Herborn Academy in Nassau, Germany, from 1686 until his death in 1696. A prominent figure in Reformed intellectual circles, Lent focused on historical theology and Semitic languages, contributing to critical studies of Jewish theology and messianic movements. His work De Moderna Theologia Judaica (Herborn, 1694) exemplifies his rigorous engagement with contemporary Jewish thought, analyzing theological developments and pseudomessianic claims within Judaism. Published in Latin, this text reflects Lent’s philological expertise and Reformed theological priorities, blending scriptural analysis with critiques of Jewish interpretations that diverged from Christian messianic expectations. Lent’s scholarship, rooted in the Reformed tradition, aligned with Herborn Academy’s role as a hub for post-Reformation theological education, emphasizing historical inquiry and linguistic precision. His other notable works include Schediasma historico philologicum de Judaeorum Pseudomessiis (1697), further cementing his legacy as a scholar of early modern Jewish-Christian theological discourse.
Table of Contents:
The Jews call the decrees of the divine essence Gezurot HaShem, that is, the Decrees of God, for God, the Blessed, hath defined and expressly established all things that shall come to pass in their order and time. They also call them Urim, or Lights, because He always keepeth a clear and living memory of His decrees. Likewise, Kimchi, in his commentary on Psalm 104, verse 4, useth the word Kavanah, meaning Intention. Yet the term most pleasing is Praescientia, or Foreknowledge, which is frequently employed by Menasseh Ben Israel, the late moderator of the Amsterdam Synagogue, in his little book On the Term of Life, pages 223, 226, 227, 231, 233, and by the learned Jew Orobio in his Friendly Colloquy with Limborch on the truth of the Christian religion, page 83. Nor need I mention Rabbi Saadiah HaGaon, Maimonides, Isaac Sangari in his book Kuzari, and other ancient writers who often use this term. Thus, Menasseh Ben Israel disputeth against those who deny divine foreknowledge and answereth their contrary arguments, both in the aforementioned little book and in his Conciliator on Genesis, where he abundantly treateth of the passages of Scripture.
They establish that the foreknowledge of all things embraceth even the smallest matters within its scope, and thus it is infinite, limited by no bounds, without any exception. So saith Orobio in his Friendly Colloquy with Limborch, page 83: “Whatsoever the Socinians subtly bark against the infinite foreknowledge of God.” And Menasseh Ben Israel in On the Term of Life, page 226: “Wherefore, it seemeth to me to approach most nearly unto the truth, as we read that Rabbi Isaac Bar Sefat hath established in his books of consultations: God, saith he, from eternity hath disposed the affairs of the whole world, and by His divine wisdom and perspicacity hath seen all the effects that should be in time.” Thus, in the Talmudic tractate Chullin, folio 7, column 2, the Rabbis relate how not even a human finger can be hurt without the divine decree: “No man hurteth his finger here below unless it be decreed above in heaven, from Psalm 37, 'The steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord.'“ Hence also we read the famous saying of the Zohar: “No thing cometh into the world which is not proclaimed from heaven, or which is not decreed by God in heaven.” Likewise, Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 21: “But all things follow His preceding knowledge, which ordereth and disposeth them as they are, whether they be abstract existences, or singular material existences, or material existences whose individuals change according to an order that is neither corrupted nor changed; and therefore with Him there is no new knowledge, nor multiplication, nor innovation, nor change, for when He knoweth the truth of His immutable substance, He knoweth at once all His works that follow therefrom.” In like manner, Rabbi Isaac Sangari demonstrateth in his book Kuzari, Part 5, section 20, that all things whatsoever come to pass must be referred to their first cause in two ways, and thus arise from the divine decree, as he writeth: “I say, therefore, that all knowable things, or all things caused, are referred to the first cause in two ways, either according to the first intention, or by concatenation and dependence.”
They extend divine foreknowledge even unto evil things, yet most excellently, with all sound and sober theologians, denying that God is the author of sin, and thus seeking the cause of evil and injustice in man himself. So speaketh Rabbi Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 17: “From the foundations of the Law of Moses, our teacher of blessed memory, and of all who adhere unto him, is this, that unto God in no wise pertaineth or should be ascribed any iniquity or injustice; and that all things, whether evils that befall man, or goods that happen unto him or unto any whole church, proceed according to the just and equal judgment of God, which is without any iniquity or injustice; so that if even a thorn should hurt a man’s hand, which he straightway draweth out, it must be deemed that it was inflicted upon him in that place; and contrariwise, if even the least good happen unto him, it must be held as a reward and retribution. All these things are from His just judgment, whereof it is said, 'All his ways are judgment'; but we know not the modes and reasons of that judgment.” Thus, they urge everywhere those sayings in which the cause and origin of evil actions are not cast upon God, but upon men themselves, and they cite Malachi, chapter 1, verse 9: “And now, I pray you, beseech God that he will be gracious unto us: this hath been by your means: will he regard your persons? saith the Lord of hosts.” Isaiah, chapter 30, verse 1: “Woe to the rebellious children, saith the Lord, that take counsel, but not of me; and that cover with a covering, but not of my spirit, that they may add sin to sin.” Jeremiah, chapter 23, verse 21: “I have not sent these prophets, yet they ran: I have not spoken to them, yet they prophesied.” So proveth Rabbi Joseph Albo that sins arise not from the necessity of the divine decree, but from the abuse of free will, when he writeth in his Book of Principles, Book 4, chapter 1: “Since, therefore, goodness or evil be in man’s free will, necessarily also good or evil things follow the determination of free will, not, as thou supposedst, that all things come to pass from the necessity of the decree.”
Likewise, they dispute against the Manichaeans, who posited two adverse gods, and set forth two diverse principles, and dreamed of two distinct natures, one of good and one of evil, showing that the origin of evil is in no wise to be sought in God, but that evil is per accidens, and dependeth upon the wickedness of men and the abuse of their will. This is clear from that which Rabbi Joseph Albo, author of Book of Principles, hath in Book 2, chapter 13: “Among the ancients there was one who thought thatHazardous the first principles are two: one of good, the other of evil. For they said that from the mouth of the Most High proceed not good and evil, that is, it cannot be that the principles of contraries be one thing; and since the universal contraries, comprehending every species of contraries, are good and evil, they said that there are two principles of things: one the principle of good, the other the principle of evil, and this was the opinion of a man called Manes.” And again in the same chapter: “Wherefore, on account of good and evil, it is not necessary to posit two diverse principles of them; for from one principle good existeth per se, but evil per accidens.” And finally in the same chapter: “Good is per se in all things that exist; but evil is beside the first intention, and is not otherwise than per accidens; even as punishment or chastisement, whereby a father correcteth his son, is evil for the sake of good, not that it is first intended, etc.” Unto whom must be joined Rabbi Isaac Bar Abraham, who in his Munimen Fidei not only relateth the opinion of the Manichaeans but also refuteth it from the Law and the Prophets, when he writeth on pages 116-117: “Moreover, when the ancient heretics saw that in this world there is an influx of contrary things, that is, promoting both good and evil actions, they supposed that there are two deities, one working good, the other evil. For they said that it cannot be that the same cause should influence both good and evil. To remove this erroneous opinion, God, the Blessed, said in His Law, Deuteronomy 32, 'See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no god with me: I kill, and I make alive; I wound, and I heal, etc.' For the same reason, God saith in Isaiah, chapter 45, 'I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil; I the Lord do all these things.' By these two sayings it is taught that the same God who killeth is also the God who giveth life; that the same who woundeth also healeth; that He who formeth light also createth darkness; that He who bringeth peace also createth evil; and that there is no other beside Him, as it seemed unto the heretics.”
They do not deny that the divine decrees are eternal, since they are the very knowledge of God, which is nothing else but His divine substance, as Maimonides witnesseth in Guide for the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 21. With Menasseh Ben Israel and Rabbi Isaac Bar Sefat, in On the Term of Life, page 226, judging that God, the Blessed, by His divine wisdom hath disposed the affairs of the whole world from eternity. That whatsoever cometh to pass in time cometh to pass from the eternal will of God, and that all animals are moved by the divine will, as Maimonides writeth in Guide for the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 17: “The foundation of the Law of Moses, our teacher, and of all who adhere unto him, is that man hath most absolute power, that is, that man by nature, choice, and will doth whatsoever man can do, without any other thing created or innovated in him. Likewise, all irrational animals are moved by their own will. And thus God, the Most High, willed, that is, His will was eternal, that every animal should be moved by its own will, and that man should have power over that which he willeth or chooseth, of those things that fall under his power. That this foundation was ever contradicted by any in our nation is not heard.” That in God, the Blessed, there is neither before nor after, neither past nor future time, but all things are most present unto Him, as Menasseh Ben Israel speaketh in On the Term of Life, pages 228-229: “For from this eternity He knew all things, not otherwise than if they were done in time. Let us illustrate the matter by a similar example: suppose a circle from whose center several lines are drawn to the circumference; with respect to this circumference, there can be considered before and after, or the distance of the lines among themselves; but with respect to the center, there is none. So also with respect to God, there is no before and after, neither past nor future time, but all things are present unto Him.”
They establish that the divine decree is one, for the knowledge of God is one, which is not multiplied nor changed by the multitude of various things decreed, which He always hath intimately foreseen. As Maimonides again testifieth in Guide for the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 20, whom it will be most pleasing to hear here: “It is confessed among all that it befitteth not the nature of God, the Most High, to have any innovation of knowledge, so that He should now know what He knew not before; neither also that He should have many knowledges, even according to those who believe in attributes. This being demonstrated, we who hold the divine law say that He knoweth many things with one knowledge; neither are knowledges multiplied in God according to the multitude of things known or knowable, as in us. Thus we say that He knoweth all things that are innovated before they come to pass, and never is ignorant of them, and consequently, no knowledge is innovated in Him. For it is known unto Him that such a one doth not now exist, but shall exist at such a time, shall continue for such a time, and then shall again not be. When, therefore, that man afterward existeth as it was in His knowledge before, it followeth that no new knowledge hath accrued, nor is anything innovated that was unknown unto Him; but that very thing which was known is innovated, as it was before it was innovated.” That although things come to pass successively one after another, yet God, the Blessed, knoweth them not successively but at once, because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as Menasseh Ben Israel writeth in his Conciliator on Exodus, question 6, page 113, which we have lately seen illustrated with notes and annotations in manuscript by Brenius: “And although contingencies come to pass successively, yet God knoweth them not successively but at once. For His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is His essence; but eternity comprehendeth all time at once and present, and therefore all things that are in time are from eternity present unto God, because His sight extendeth from eternity unto all things, insofar as they are in His presence. Whence it is manifest that contingencies are known infallibly by God, insofar as they are subject to the divine view, according to the mode of divine presence; nevertheless, they are future contingencies compared to their causes.”
They most excellently deny that foreknowledge necessitateth, repudiating inevitable and absolute necessity, as well as hard and fatal compulsion, which would take away all free will and contingency in human affairs. They reject the Stoic fate, holding that the divine will imposeth not necessity upon all things, but rather is the cause of all human liberty and contingency. Hence, they call such necessary dependence not only a most ancient error, which the sect of the Ash’ariyyah among the Ishmaelites once famously upheld, who, as Maimonides witnesseth in Guide for the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 17, believed that nothing in this world, neither universal nor particular, cometh to pass by contingency, but all things are from a certain will, intention, and governance. But they overthrow this with many arguments, demonstrating that by fatal compulsion of all things, contingency and liberty to either of opposites are taken away from human affairs. As Maimonides again speaketh in Guide for the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 17: “According to this opinion, it followeth also that all motions and rests of animals are decreed by God, and that man hath no power either to do or to forbear. Moreover, according to that opinion, the contingency of things is taken away, and it followeth that all things are either necessary or impossible, which they acknowledge, and say also that those things which are commonly called possible, as that Reuben should remain or Simeon come, are possible with respect to us, but with respect to God there is no possibility at all in them, but they are either necessary or impossible.” If an absolute fatal divine decree be posited, all means and endeavors to obtain or avoid anything are useless and vain. So saith Rabbi Isaac Sangari in his book Kuzari, Part 5, section 20: “He denieth the nature of the possible or contingent who is of a perverse and profane mind, who saith that which he believeth not. For thou seest how each one prepareth himself for that which he hopeth or feareth; and this teacheth thee that he believeth that thing to be possible, and preparation is profitable for it. But if he believed that thing to be absolutely and necessarily future, then he would expose himself freely, and would not arm himself against his enemy, nor provide against famine.” All laws, admonitions, promises, and threatenings would be useless. So saith Rabbi Saadiah in Sepher Emunah, folio 26: “If God necessitated man, precepts and prohibitions made unto him would be useless.” Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 17: “Moreover, it followeth from this opinion that laws are of no profit, since man, unto whom all laws are given, hath no power either to do any of the things commanded or to forbear any of the things forbidden.” But we are admonished to be solicitous to avoid evil and choose good, because both are in our power, as Menasseh Ben Israel speaketh in On the Term of Life, page 202. That God would be unjust if He punished men for that which they were predestined to do, and which from the necessity of the divine decree they must needs do. Thus again Menasseh Ben Israel in the cited little book, page 194: “It would be too unjust also that God should punish men for that which they were predestined to do, and which from the force of the divine decree they could not but do.” And on page 196: “Not to say that God would have been unjust, which is blasphemous to think of God, when He punished him, if he had not that free power.” That there would be no place for rewards and punishments if it were established that all things come to pass from the decree; and that thus man stumbleth against the article of faith concerning reward and punishment, yea, that he imputeth iniquity and wickedness unto God, that God punisheth the sinner beyond his desert, if indeed he could not do otherwise than he did. As Rabbi Joseph Albo disputeth in Book of Principles, Book 1, chapter 13, which Matthias Elia translated into Latin, as found in Winckelmann. That there would be no difference between the virtuous and the vicious, nor any prerogative of the good over the reprobate, but both must be held as worshippers of God, since both do that unto which they are ordained and impelled. Likewise, to the objections raised, they not only answer in many places with Rabbi Isaac Sangari in Kuzari, pages 369-370 of Buxtorf’s edition and translation, but sometimes unjustly and very ignorantly accuse the Reformed, either that they judge not the means necessary for the execution of the divine decrees, or that all things which ought to be done by man must come to pass not freely but necessarily, as Menasseh Ben Israel hath sometimes written. Yet this calumny of religion hath been happily repelled not without fruit by our men so often, nor doth the school of Calvin alone keep, worship, and adore this notable and illustrious mystery of heavenly truth and wisdom, as Odehlius hath not without brotherly love objected unto us in his Bifrons Synagoga, page 96.