[Doctrina foederum, sive systema theologica didacticae et elencticae (Amstelodami , 1691)]
Johannes Braunius (1628–1708), a venerable divine of the Dutch Reformed tradition, was born at Kaiserslautern in the year of our Lord 1628, and was trained in sacred learning at the illustrious University of Leiden, where he sat under the eminent Johannes Coccejus. Nurtured in the federal and covenantal theology of the Reformation, Braunius gave himself to the laborious study of the Hebrew tongue and the Levitical institutions of the Old Testament, wherein he discerned types and shadows of gospel mysteries. He ministered as a faithful pastor and was later appointed to the chair of theology at the University of Groningen in 1681, a post he held unto his death nearly three decades thereafter. His life was adorned not only with erudition, but with devotion, uniting the careful exposition of Scripture with reverence for the covenant mercies of God. Among his chief works stands Vestitus Sacerdotum Hebraeorum, a deep and learned commentary upon the vestments and ordinances of the Aaronic priesthood, drawn from the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth chapters of Exodus and the sixteenth of Leviticus, showing forth the typological beauty of the ceremonial law as fulfilled in Christ. Likewise, his Doctrina Foedorum offered a comprehensive system of didactic and elenctic theology, built upon the foundation of federal theology, expounding the covenant of works and grace with scholastic clarity. In all his writings, Braunius exhibited that rare balance of penetrating intellect and humble piety, ever seeking the edification of the church and the glory of the Redeemer, whose garments of righteousness he found prefigured in those of the ancient priesthood. He fell asleep in the Lord in the year 1708, full of days and full of faith.
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The first part of the covenant, to wit, the instrument of the covenant, wherein we treated of Holy Scripture, we have completed. There followeth the second part, namely, of the parties covenanted, God and man, wherein also, in its place, we shall treat briefly of angels. In a twofold manner doth God manifest Himself in His Word: (1) ἐσιωδῶς (essentially), in His nature and essence, as can be demonstrated by reason itself; (2) ὑποστατικῶς (subsistentially), as to His subsistence, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; which is not so much a natural as a revealed knowledge of God.
Moreover, the knowledge of God is partly innate, partly acquired. The acquired followeth the innate and presupposeth it, so that we could never have the least suspicion of God without that innate knowledge. What? Not even the very word “God” would we ever understand without it. Innate knowledge is that very idea which we have of a certain most perfect divine being, than which nothing more perfect can be conceived. It mattereth little whether we call this idea σύλληψις (conception) with Epicurus, as Cicero testifieth in De Natura Deorum, Book I; or whether we say thought, concept, perception, notion, representation, or κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι (common notions), so long as we agree on the matter, to wit, that there is in our mind a certain mark which representeth unto us a certain most perfect divine being. Since all these words—concept, perception, notion, representation, and σύλληψις—are metaphorical, drawn from gross and corporeal things, even as the word “idea,” and since most are general terms, nor do they specifically express the manner of thinking which we have of God, any more than the very word “thought,” we prefer to retain the word “idea” to designate that manner of thinking which we have of God; since it can no less commodiously than all the other words be applied to incorporeal things and represent them, as the other words; and since theologians, as well as philosophers, are wont to attribute to God Himself eternal ideas of things to come: so that an idea need not always be said to be formed from a corporeal thing, unless we say that God Himself drew His ideas from corporeal things from eternity, which would be impiety itself. Therefore, the idea of God representeth not unto us a corporeal image of God, but the highest perfection, which hath plainly nothing in common with extension or body.
That there is such an idea in the mind of man is so clear that no man can doubt of God or deny His existence, since he hath that idea in his mind, and indeed present, when he doubteth or judgeth of an unknown thing, than which nothing more absurd or unjust can be said. Much more do they have the idea of God who affirm that He existeth; otherwise it would be as if they affirmed the existence of blittri, of which word they have no concept, no idea. Yet it followeth not that this idea is always actually present to our mind, for then we should think of nothing but God: since no idea can always be actually present to us, so that we always think of it, and of it only, and of no other thing, because of the weakness of our mind, which permitteth not that we have many, much less all, ideas present at once; for this is proper to God alone, who with a single act contemplateth and hath present the ideas of all things at once.
This idea is said to represent a most perfect being, than which nothing more perfect can be conceived. Not that it hath perfections only relative, but absolute and all-encompassing perfection in itself, which partaketh not at all of non-being. And although many perfections are wont to occur to our mind whenever we think of God, yet this cometh not from the nature of God, but from the weakness of our mind, which is accustomed to conceive even the simplest things as if by parts; otherwise, if we seriously attend to the idea of God, we shall perceive it to be most simple, and that in God there is only one perfection, and that most simple, which infinitely surpasseth all perfections. And since no greater perfection can be conceived than will, it followeth that the idea of God representeth unto us a most simple will, which with a single act and a single volition willeth, knoweth, and effecteth whatsoever was, is, and shall be forever. Than this simple will, nothing more perfect can be conceived, wherefore it must necessarily be said that God is the purest act. Whence it followeth that God is immutable, the cause of all things, independent, and that all things depend on Him, in whatsoever state or order they be; that God possesseth His whole life and blessedness at once and wholly, and therefore is eternal, nor can any time be conceived in Him. It followeth also thence that the idea of God can in no wise be compared with an idea which positeth any composition of many virtues, perfections, powers, acts, and faculties; much less can it be compared with any feigned idea which is composed of the ideas of many bodies; since all composition, however of the most excellent things, positeth imperfection and a finite thing. For although the perfection of God containeth all perfections, yea, surpasseth them all infinitely, yet His perfection, as it is the highest, so also is it one and most simple.
Although this idea representeth unto us a most perfect being, it followeth not that it is adequate; that is, that we can or ought exactly and most perfectly know the essence of God and comprehend all His virtues; since no thing, even the least, is given whose essence we know adequately. Nay, by this very fact, that the idea of God representeth unto me infinite perfection, I am compelled to confess that I cannot adequately comprehend it, or that I myself am infinite and thus God. Nor is it of the nature of a most perfect being that we comprehend all and infinite of His perfections adequately; but only that such a being hath infinite perfection: even as I can know a triangle, to wit, that it hath three angles equal to two right angles, although I know not perfectly all that is contained in a triangle; or even as I can know an emperor to be the supreme monarch in his kingdom, although I know not all his virtues, riches, power, and the like.
Since this idea is such that it representeth unto us the highest and infinite perfection, it followeth that it can neither be increased nor diminished; for in the infinite, nothing can be added or taken away. And although sometimes certain perfections of God become known to us which we knew not before, yet it followeth not thence that the idea which we have of God is increased: but only that it becometh clearer and more distinct, even as a mathematician, who knoweth all the properties of a triangle, knoweth a triangle much more distinctly than a rustic who knoweth only the nature of a triangle in general, to wit, that a triangle hath three angles equal to two right angles. Or even as a courtier knoweth an emperor more distinctly, who knoweth many of his virtues, power, counsels, and the like, than a rustic who knoweth not all these. Nevertheless, the rustic hath the idea of a triangle or of an emperor no less than the greatest mathematician or the emperor’s chief minister; for he knoweth a triangle, not only by negation, what it is not—not a square, not a circle, not a rhombus—but also positively, that it hath three angles equal to two right angles. So he knoweth an emperor, not only that he is not the lowest subject, not a minister, but that he is the highest, who commandeth all others. Whence it followeth again that the idea of God representeth unto us all-encompassing reality and a positive thing, not a negative, and therefore God ought to be defined (as far as He can be defined) not by negative terms, but rather by affirmative and positive ones.