[Doctrina foederum, sive systema theologica didacticae et elencticae (Amstelodami , 1691)]
Johannes Braunius (1628–1708), a venerable divine of the Dutch Reformed tradition, was born at Kaiserslautern in the year of our Lord 1628, and was trained in sacred learning at the illustrious University of Leiden, where he sat under the eminent Johannes Coccejus. Nurtured in the federal and covenantal theology of the Reformation, Braunius gave himself to the laborious study of the Hebrew tongue and the Levitical institutions of the Old Testament, wherein he discerned types and shadows of gospel mysteries. He ministered as a faithful pastor and was later appointed to the chair of theology at the University of Groningen in 1681, a post he held unto his death nearly three decades thereafter. His life was adorned not only with erudition, but with devotion, uniting the careful exposition of Scripture with reverence for the covenant mercies of God. Among his chief works stands Vestitus Sacerdotum Hebraeorum, a deep and learned commentary upon the vestments and ordinances of the Aaronic priesthood, drawn from the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth chapters of Exodus and the sixteenth of Leviticus, showing forth the typological beauty of the ceremonial law as fulfilled in Christ. Likewise, his Doctrina Foedorum offered a comprehensive system of didactic and elenctic theology, built upon the foundation of federal theology, expounding the covenant of works and grace with scholastic clarity. In all his writings, Braunius exhibited that rare balance of penetrating intellect and humble piety, ever seeking the edification of the church and the glory of the Redeemer, whose garments of righteousness he found prefigured in those of the ancient priesthood. He fell asleep in the Lord in the year 1708, full of days and full of faith.
Table of Contents:
<aside>
</aside>
Hitherto we have treated of the internal and absolute attributes of God, to wit, of knowledge and will; it followeth that we treat of the relative attributes. These are called either affections, as love, hatred, wrath, desire, aversion, joy, sorrow, hope, mercy, repentance, etc., or virtues, as justice, holiness, truth, meekness, long-suffering, severity, etc., or it is called the executing principle, such as omnipotence. Or it is referred to place, and is called omnipresence; or to time, and is called eternity. It mattereth little in what order we proceed, so long as we neglect not the matter itself. We shall first treat of the executing principle, or of the omnipotence of God: since it is the very efficacious will of God, of which we have treated, and thus is no less to be referred to the will of God than His affections. First, therefore, of the power of God, afterward of His affections, and lastly of His virtues.
The executing principle, therefore, is the omnipotence of God. For not only unto God, as Lord, is to be ascribed imperium, that is, supreme right and dominion, but also the very δύναμις, that is, aptitude, force, and power, by which He effecteth that which is subject to His authority. Passive power is most wickedly attributed to God by Vorstius and others, since it positeth some imperfection and change, which cannot fall in God, James 1:17. For although God be said to be worshipped, loved, blasphemed, yet thence nothing new accrueth unto Him, neither by our piety nor by our impiety, Job 35:7; 22:2. Nor hath anything accrued unto Him by creation, except a certain external relation, which positeth nothing in God. And although the Son be generated, and the Holy Spirit proceed, yet it followeth not thence that God hath suffered anything. For (1) the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit are not referred to the essential attributes, of which this question treateth, but only to the personal. (2) Generation and procession are eternal and natural, therefore they posit no passion which might happen to God in time. (3) Generation and procession denote not passion, but action and the highest perfection. (4) It cannot be said that the Son could ever have been generated, or of the Holy Spirit that He could ever have proceeded; since generation and procession are eternal no less than the essence of God itself. (5) Finally, generation and procession denote a mystery which surpasseth our capacity. Therefore, only active power befitteth God, since, as the Scholastics most excellently say, He is the purest act. And verily, that God is not only powerful but also omnipotent followeth from His highest perfection, since omnipotence is not the least perfection. The same doth Holy Scripture teach: “Our God is in the heavens: He hath done whatsoever He hath pleased,” Psalm 115:3; Romans 11:36. See 2 Chronicles 20:6; Luke 1:37. Hence also He is called παντοκράτωρ (Almighty), 2 Corinthians 6:18.
Since the attributes differ not by nature from the essence of God nor from one another, but only according to our manner of conceiving, as we have shown in the preceding chapter, it followeth that His power is nothing other than His most efficacious will, in so far as it exerteth itself toward creatures. Therefore, God hath made all things whatsoever He hath made, doth make, and shall make, with one most simple nod of His will; so that with that one and eternal act of will He createth and preserveth spirits, bodies, and their operations, motions, and changes, in one word, whatsoever can be conceived in things. Although the same will, according to various relations, is said to create, preserve, govern, destroy, punish, do good, etc. And verily, that the omnipotence of God is His very efficacious will is evident: (1) Because He is a being most perfect, therefore He operateth also in the most perfect manner; but a more perfect manner of operating cannot be conceived than that which is by will: so that as soon as He willeth a thing to exist, it also existeth forthwith at His nod. (2) Because there is no greater connection between the application of a body and the production of a work than between the application of the will and the effect. (3) Because if a force or anything else distinct from the will of God were conceived, by which He operated, then the essence of God would be conceived as composite, which is absurd. That force would be either created or uncreated. If created, whence and by whom would it be created? (4) Because in Holy Scripture He is said to work by His command alone: “Let there be light, and there was light,” Genesis 1:3; Psalm 148:5. “Who hath resisted His will?” Romans 9:19. Hence counsel, that is, decree, or will, which are the same, and the hand of God are taken for the same, Acts 4:28. Therefore, the power of God is not to be conceived as ours, as if a new will were required for every single action, or as if, beyond the will, He had need of many motions, efforts, and great labor to work.
But since the power of God is His very efficacious will, so that all things necessarily present themselves to His nod and counsels in producing His works, it followeth: (1) That God, in producing His works, hath no need of any pre-existing matter, but all things come forth from nothing at His will. (2) That God needeth no instruments in creating things; for the will needeth no instrument to will. Nor is there a greater connection between the application of an instrument (whether applied to nothing or to something) and the production of a thing, than between the application of a most perfect will to nothing, that a thing should forthwith exist, Psalm 33:6; Hebrews 1:3. (3) That God needeth neither delay nor time, for the will operateth all things in a moment. (4) That He cannot be wearied, since the will cannot be fatigued, Isaiah 40:28. (5) That God always acteth most freely, nor can He be determined from elsewhere, since the will cannot be compelled, Psalm 115:3. (6) It followeth also that all things are subject to the power of God. For there is no reason why God could not equally will this as that. Moreover, with God nothing is impossible, Luke 1:37. Therefore, He is not so much to be called powerful as omnipotent; not so much κραταιός (mighty) as παντοκράτωρ (almighty), 2 Corinthians 6:18; Revelation 1:8; Philippians 3:21. Impossible, therefore, is that which God willeth not, which by reason of His highest perfections He cannot will, and which would overthrow His nature. Although, therefore, we ought not rashly to define what God can do and what He cannot, lest we who are finite should seem to set limits to His infinite power; nevertheless, it cannot be said that God can effect contradictories, that is, that a thing should be and not be at the same time. For this would overthrow His will and power, because in willing He would yet have willed nothing, and in working He would have worked nothing. So it is impossible that God should make a triangle which hath not three angles. For thus He would operate against His will, because when He willeth a triangle, He necessarily willeth it to have three angles. So it is impossible that He should make twice two which are not four: for when He maketh twice two, He willeth that four should exist, otherwise more or fewer would exist than He willeth, which would denote the highest imperfection. So He cannot annihilate Himself, or hate Himself: since His highest perfection involveth necessary existence, as we have proved in its place; nor is it possible that He should hate the highest perfection. He cannot manifest Himself to a creature so as to be hated by it: since He is most perfect, and the highest good, and hath so created our will that it cannot hate a known good. Not ill, therefore, do some say that God cannot do these things most powerfully.
It followeth not, therefore, that God is not omnipotent: (1) Because He cannot effect contradictories, since contradictories are nothing and would overthrow His highest perfection. (2) Nor is His omnipotence to be denied because He cannot produce a creature infinitely perfect; because infinite perfection involveth necessary existence, which falleth not in a creature, for that which necessarily existeth cannot be created. Hence also it is evident that God cannot communicate His infinite power to a creature, as to the human nature of Christ, as the Lutherans contend: much less His divinity, as the Socinians teach.
From these things which we have said of the power of God, it may easily be answered to the question of the Scholastics: whether the knowledge of God be the cause of things, or rather His will. In so far as the knowledge of God, even as all His attributes, is His very essence in an identical sense, to that extent it can be called the cause of things. But if it be considered in a formal sense, it is certain that not knowledge, but will, is the cause of things. For God (1) operateth and produceth all things outside Himself, not by His knowledge, but by His most efficacious will, Psalm 115:3. (2) He knoweth good and evil, true and false, yet He effecteth not evil and false things by His knowledge. (3) He knoweth His essence and all His perfections, yet He effecteth them not. Therefore, the knowledge of God, strictly taken, which signifieth mere cognition, is not the cause of things, but His efficacious will. (1) It is said in vain: that the intellect is the very essence of God, and that God operateth by His essence, therefore also by His intellect. For although it be His essence in an identical sense, yet it is not in a formal sense. But in a formal sense, it cannot be conceived that He operateth by intellect, but by will only; otherwise justice also is His essence in an identical sense, yet, according to our manner of conceiving, it cannot be said that He operateth by justice. (2) And although God be said to create by His word, Psalm 33:6, “And He said, Let there be light, and there was light,” Genesis 1:3, yet they will prove nothing thence. The word of God signifieth His decree and will, more than mere knowledge as conceived by us. I say not that Psalm 33:6 ought to be understood of the substantial Word, that is, the Son of God, who is so often called the Word in Holy Scripture.