[Doctrina foederum, sive systema theologica didacticae et elencticae (Amstelodami , 1691)]

Johannes Braunius (1628–1708), a venerable divine of the Dutch Reformed tradition, was born at Kaiserslautern in the year of our Lord 1628, and was trained in sacred learning at the illustrious University of Leiden, where he sat under the eminent Johannes Coccejus. Nurtured in the federal and covenantal theology of the Reformation, Braunius gave himself to the laborious study of the Hebrew tongue and the Levitical institutions of the Old Testament, wherein he discerned types and shadows of gospel mysteries. He ministered as a faithful pastor and was later appointed to the chair of theology at the University of Groningen in 1681, a post he held unto his death nearly three decades thereafter. His life was adorned not only with erudition, but with devotion, uniting the careful exposition of Scripture with reverence for the covenant mercies of God. Among his chief works stands Vestitus Sacerdotum Hebraeorum, a deep and learned commentary upon the vestments and ordinances of the Aaronic priesthood, drawn from the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth chapters of Exodus and the sixteenth of Leviticus, showing forth the typological beauty of the ceremonial law as fulfilled in Christ. Likewise, his Doctrina Foedorum offered a comprehensive system of didactic and elenctic theology, built upon the foundation of federal theology, expounding the covenant of works and grace with scholastic clarity. In all his writings, Braunius exhibited that rare balance of penetrating intellect and humble piety, ever seeking the edification of the church and the glory of the Redeemer, whose garments of righteousness he found prefigured in those of the ancient priesthood. He fell asleep in the Lord in the year 1708, full of days and full of faith.

Johannes Braunius (1628–1708), a venerable divine of the Dutch Reformed tradition, was born at Kaiserslautern in the year of our Lord 1628, and was trained in sacred learning at the illustrious University of Leiden, where he sat under the eminent Johannes Coccejus. Nurtured in the federal and covenantal theology of the Reformation, Braunius gave himself to the laborious study of the Hebrew tongue and the Levitical institutions of the Old Testament, wherein he discerned types and shadows of gospel mysteries. He ministered as a faithful pastor and was later appointed to the chair of theology at the University of Groningen in 1681, a post he held unto his death nearly three decades thereafter. His life was adorned not only with erudition, but with devotion, uniting the careful exposition of Scripture with reverence for the covenant mercies of God. Among his chief works stands Vestitus Sacerdotum Hebraeorum, a deep and learned commentary upon the vestments and ordinances of the Aaronic priesthood, drawn from the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth chapters of Exodus and the sixteenth of Leviticus, showing forth the typological beauty of the ceremonial law as fulfilled in Christ. Likewise, his Doctrina Foedorum offered a comprehensive system of didactic and elenctic theology, built upon the foundation of federal theology, expounding the covenant of works and grace with scholastic clarity. In all his writings, Braunius exhibited that rare balance of penetrating intellect and humble piety, ever seeking the edification of the church and the glory of the Redeemer, whose garments of righteousness he found prefigured in those of the ancient priesthood. He fell asleep in the Lord in the year 1708, full of days and full of faith.

Table of Contents:

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Chapter VII: On the Trinity in General

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I. Introduction to the Trinity

We have spoken of God πλάτος (in breadth), as He is considered in His nature; now we must speak of Him βάθος (in depth), and thus of the Holy Trinity. Before all things, we must call under examination the words Nature, Essence, Existence, Suppositum, Person, and Subsistence, by which words this mystery is wont to be delivered.

II. The Term “Nature”

Nature is so called from nascendo (being born), so that, strictly speaking, it is attributed only to creatures. Yet since it also signifieth that which a thing is, or the essence itself, it is not ill attributed unto God also. Hence false gods are called those who are not gods by nature, Οἱμὴ φύσει Θεοί, Galatians 4:8. In Greek it is φύσις, and οὐσία from the verb εἰμί (I am). To the Hebrews, תּוּשִׁיָּה, Job 12:16, from the same verb as the substantive. And to the Latins, Essentia, from the same verb. And יהוה (Yahweh) from היה (He was). It is called θειότης, Romans 1:20, and μορφή and Θεός, Philippians 2:6.

III. Essence and Existence

Every thing that hath an essence, or nature, hath also existence, which ought not to be conceived as a mode of the thing, but as the act itself; for it is nothing else than the act whereby a thing existeth, not only in our concept, as a rose in winter, but actually in itself. Since accidents, properly speaking, are not beings, but only modify substances, it followeth that an accident hath no existence save in the substance itself. Substance therefore is a being subsisting by itself, which, that is, needeth no other thing to exist save God alone. But it is not of the essence of substance to underlie accidents, as is manifest in God, in whom there is no accident. And substance is either material, and is called a suppositum, or intellectual or spiritual, and is called a person.

IV. Subsistence Defined

Subsistence is a mode of substances. Sometimes it is taken in the concrete, and then it signifieth a suppositum or person. Sometimes in the abstract, for the manner whereby a thing is said to subsist. Subsistence in the abstract consisteth not in incommunicability, by which a thing cannot be joined with another to constitute one suppositum with it, but in the very incommunication, or negation of union with another, to constitute a suppositum or person. That subsistence is not something possible, such as incommunicability, but that which can now be affirmed in act, that is, the present negation of union with another, is evident:

  1. Because subsistence is said of a thing that actually existeth, and which is not actually joined with another. Thus, for example, every drop of water hath its own subsistence, and thus maketh a suppositum, because it is not actually united with other drops, not that it cannot be united with them.
  2. Because any natural parts of substances distinct from each other can constitute one suppositum, and from one suppositum many can be made. For example, a thousand drops of some liquid, so long as they are disjoined, each hath its own subsistence, and thus maketh a suppositum, yet they can all be joined and constitute only one suppositum. Therefore, their subsistence consisteth not in incommunicability (otherwise they could never be communicated or joined), but in the actual incommunication, since one is not joined with another. The same may be said of a branch separated from a tree; for it hath its own subsistence, and thus maketh a suppositum, yet it can be united and inserted into some trunk, and with it make one suppositum and one tree.
  3. Add that every angel hath its own subsistence, and thus is a person; for it is a singular intelligent substance. Therefore, its subsistence consisteth in the sole negation of union with another, because it is not actually joined with any substance; but it consisteth not in incommunicability, because by absolute power it could be ordered to another thing, to constitute with it a whole.

V. Objections Concerning Subsistence

From this, however, it followeth not:

  1. If an angel assumeth to himself an economical body, or if a man joineth to himself a cloak, that one suppositum is made of the angel and the cloak, because the angel would not be joined to the economical body, nor the man to the cloak, so as to become one suppositum or whole; for he would still exist with such a substance as would make a suppositum or person. Add that it may be retorted: If subsistence consisteth in the impossibility of conjunction, it would follow that every conjunction necessarily positeth a suppositum, so that an angel with a body, or a man with a cloak, would make one suppositum.
  2. Nor is it to be feared that the soul separated from the body is a person; since it hath not yet been proved that there is any absurdity in this, just as it is not absurd if we say that a drop of wine separated from the whole cask, or a branch torn from the tree, hath its own subsistence, and thus is a suppositum. No one will deny that a corpse separated from the soul hath its own subsistence, and thus is a suppositum without a soul. Why, therefore, should the soul separated from the body not have its own subsistence? Why should it not be a suppositum without a body? If, moreover, it hath its own subsistence without the body, and thus is a suppositum, what will it be if not a person? Since every intellectual suppositum is a person. Yet it followeth not thence that in man there obtain three persons: (1) By the conjunction of body and soul, or of the whole composite; (2) A peculiar one of the soul after separation from the body; (3) Again of the composite by reunion in the resurrection. For only a threefold state of the same person would be given, not three persons. One state would be in this life, another after death, another after the resurrection. In this life, the soul is a person constituting one man with the body. After death, it would be a person separated from the body, so that it would not be called a man. After the resurrection, it again with the body constituteth a man: as another would be the state of the whole cask of liquid; another of the separated drop; another if the drops be reunited. In whatsoever state the liquid be, yet it always hath its own subsistence, and thus maketh a suppositum. But these are not dogmas of faith, and how far they can be applied to divine things, we shall examine where we treat of the incarnation.

VI. Suppositum and Person Defined

From these things, it is readily evident what a suppositum is: to wit, a singular substance not joined to another, so as to make a whole with it. For example, this stone, this tree, is a suppositum. This drop of liquid is a suppositum, so long as it is not joined with another. The word “person” anciently was used only in the theater, signifying him who appeared in the play. Hence personatus, who representeth another than himself, who, though poorer than Irus, yet feigneth himself a king and the richest Croesus. To the Greeks, it is πρόσωπον. The ancients used two words, πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις. The Greeks said πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις, the Latins in the same manner persona and subsistentia, which signify the same as the Greek. It would have been safer if they had retained only this word ὑπόστασις, for thus we should speak with Holy Scripture. For Paul useth the word ὑπόστασις in Hebrews 1:3, where he calleth Christ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ πατρός (the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His person). Nevertheless, since the words persona and πρόσωπον have been received in the Christian Church, they ought not rashly to be rejected; for words have value by use. But the word πρόσωπον itself occurreth for a man in 2 Corinthians 1:11, just as in Cicero, Cornelius Nepos, and other authors, it often signifieth a man, as also among the Germans, Gauls, and others. Some think that this is the difference between ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον: that the former signifieth any thing that hath subsistence, whether inanimate or animate, which the Scholastics call a suppositum, but a person is an intelligent substance; such as God, an angel, and a man. Nevertheless, ὑπόστασις or subsistence signifieth both, that is, even an intelligent substance, Hebrews 1:3.

VII. Hypostasis and Prosopon in the Trinity