[Volumen Thesium theologicarum per locos communes disputatarum in academia Franequerana; (Franekerae: Uld. Balck, 1639)]

Johannes Maccovius (c. 1588–1644), born Jan Makowski in the year of our Lord 1588 in Lobzenic, Great Poland, emerged as a radiant star in the firmament of Reformed scholastic theology. Of noble Polish lineage, he was nurtured in learning first at the gymnasium of Danzig under the tutelage of the renowned Bartholomaeus Keckermann, wherein he laid a strong foundation in the arts and the philosophy of Aristotle. Ever zealous for wisdom, he journeyed as a peregrinus academicus through the academies of Germany, including Prague, Marburg, Heidelberg, and Leipzig, before at length attaining the celebrated University of Franeker in Friesland. At Franeker he attained his doctorate in sacred theology in 1614, being speedily advanced to the office of professor ordinarius, where he exercised his gifts for near thirty years. Maccovius did tenaciously defend the purity of Reformed doctrine, being noted for his supralapsarian convictions concerning predestination and for his subtlety in scholastic method, wherein he was esteemed above many. With keen intellect and ardent zeal, he contended for the faith against Jesuits, Socinians, Arminians, and all adversaries of orthodox Calvinism. His disputations were many, and his classes thronged with students from Poland, Hungary, Transylvania, and beyond, whom he instructed with rigor and piety. Throughout his course he was not without controversy: his method, logical distinctions, and strong assertions occasioned strife, notably with Sibrandus Lubbertus and William Ames, as well as censure at the Synod of Dordrecht. Yet he was acquitted of heresy and confirmed in his teaching. His principal works, Collegium Theologicum and Distinctiones et Regulae Theologicae, endure as monuments of Protestant learning. Having completed his pilgrimage, he fell asleep in Christ at Franeker in 1644, leaving an enduring legacy among the Reformed.

Johannes Maccovius (c. 1588–1644), born Jan Makowski in the year of our Lord 1588 in Lobzenic, Great Poland, emerged as a radiant star in the firmament of Reformed scholastic theology. Of noble Polish lineage, he was nurtured in learning first at the gymnasium of Danzig under the tutelage of the renowned Bartholomaeus Keckermann, wherein he laid a strong foundation in the arts and the philosophy of Aristotle. Ever zealous for wisdom, he journeyed as a peregrinus academicus through the academies of Germany, including Prague, Marburg, Heidelberg, and Leipzig, before at length attaining the celebrated University of Franeker in Friesland. At Franeker he attained his doctorate in sacred theology in 1614, being speedily advanced to the office of professor ordinarius, where he exercised his gifts for near thirty years. Maccovius did tenaciously defend the purity of Reformed doctrine, being noted for his supralapsarian convictions concerning predestination and for his subtlety in scholastic method, wherein he was esteemed above many. With keen intellect and ardent zeal, he contended for the faith against Jesuits, Socinians, Arminians, and all adversaries of orthodox Calvinism. His disputations were many, and his classes thronged with students from Poland, Hungary, Transylvania, and beyond, whom he instructed with rigor and piety. Throughout his course he was not without controversy: his method, logical distinctions, and strong assertions occasioned strife, notably with Sibrandus Lubbertus and William Ames, as well as censure at the Synod of Dordrecht. Yet he was acquitted of heresy and confirmed in his teaching. His principal works, Collegium Theologicum and Distinctiones et Regulae Theologicae, endure as monuments of Protestant learning. Having completed his pilgrimage, he fell asleep in Christ at Franeker in 1644, leaving an enduring legacy among the Reformed.

Table of Contents:

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DISPUTATION XXVII: CONCERNING PREDESTINATION

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THESIS I. Having treated of the decrees of God in general, we must now specifically address the decree of God, namely Predestination.

I. On the Definition of Predestination

THESIS II. Predestination is the eternal decree of God, or the eternal will of God concerning the supernatural end of every man and the means for attaining that end.

We do not here treat of the predestination of Angels, since although the Holy Spirit addresses this in the sacred writings, He does so briefly and in passing, as the Holy Spirit willed that His word be set forth not for Angels, but for men.

II. On the Etymology and Parts of Predestination

THESIS III. The term Predestination can and should be applied both to Election and to Reprobation.

(I.) Proof of Predestinations Dual Parts

That Predestination can and should be accommodated to both Election and Reprobation is evident:

  1. Because Election is not only expressly called predestination in Romans 9 and Ephesians 1, but this name is also applied to the reprobate in Acts 4: “They gathered to do whatever thy hand had predestined.” For these words can and should be referred also to those reprobates who gathered against the Lord, namely to Herod and Pilate, so that Jesus, God not only predestined that Christ should die, but also that He should die by their hands, and thus these men were prepared to accomplish Christ’s death.
  2. Furthermore, this appears from the fact that with some predestined to life, the rest are understood to be predestined to death. For the nature of opposition demands this. Therefore, whenever Scripture mentions the predestination of the Elect to life, it also confirms predestination to death.
  3. Because damnation to death, which now occurs in time, presupposes predestination, which was done from eternity, just as justification and life presuppose destination and ordination to justification and life.
  4. Because predestination is God’s decree concerning men and their supernatural end. Now God has decreed no less concerning the Reprobate than concerning the Elect, what He would do; that is, He decreed no less concerning their damnation to death than concerning the justification of these others, that is, their ordination to life, and thus as He predestined these to life, so He predestined those to death. Hence it happens that the Fathers, understanding predestination generally, accommodate it not only to the Elect, but also to the reprobate, so that both are said to be predestined from eternity, the former to life, the latter to death. Thus Augustine,City of God, Book 15, Chapter 1: “Mystically we call them two Cities, that is, two societies of men, of which one is predestined to reign eternally with God, the other to undergo eternal judgment with the Devil.” And in Enchiridion, Chapter 100, he teaches that God as supremely good makes good use both of the good and the evil, for the damnation of those whom He has justly predestined to punishment, and for the salvation of those whom He has benevolently predestined to grace.

(II.) Objections to Predestination’s Dual Application

I. Some object:

“That of those whom He predestined, it is also said that He justified and glorified them, which cannot be said of the reprobate at all. Hence they wish to conclude that predestination cannot be accommodated to reprobation. The antecedent is certain from the Epistle to Romans, chapter 8.”

Response: The said passage does not speak of those predestined universally, but of those predestined who are foreknown, for thus the text says: “whom he foreknew, these he also predestined.” But there “foreknowledge” is understood not as simple and bare, by which God foreknows all things, but foreknowledge with affection or love, which love is called by theologians the love of benevolence, so that the sense is: those whom He embraced with the love of benevolence, those He predestined, namely to life, as the following shows.

II. They object with reason, saying:

“That which does not have a properly called end, to it the word predestination is badly accommodated. But reprobation does not have a properly called end, for a properly called end is good. But condemnation, which is called the end of reprobation, is not good, but evil.”

Response: We distinguish between the ultimate end and the intermediate end. Granted that condemnation is the end of reprobation, it will be the intermediate end, not the ultimate. For the ultimate is the manifestation of God’s justice in just condemnation. Secondly, just condemnation is not simply evil, because it is inflicted by law and conforms to law, and what conforms to God’s law, whether as work or punishment, is morally good.