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Δίκη, ἡ, connected with δείκνυμι, dicere, zeigen, originally = manner, tendency; so still in the absolute accusative δίκην, after its kind, manner, not rare in Pindar, Plato, and the Tragedians; e.g. Plato, Phaedr. 249 D, ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω. So also in Homer, e.g. Od. xix. 43, xxiv. 255, αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶν θεῶν, and often, as = manner. See Curtius, p. 125. Hence δίκη gradually became the designation for the right of established custom or usage, and was personified as the daughter of Zeus and Themis; comp. Acts xxviii. 4, ὃν διασωθέντα ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἡ Δίκη ζῇν οὐκ εἴασεν. This personification was transferred to Jewish soil, Wisd. i. 8, οὐδὲ παροδεύσῃαὐτὸν ἡ δίκη. Suidas, ὀπισθόπους δίκη, ἡ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἀκολουθοῦσα τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν.
The use of this word in its entire range is based upon the important idea here involved, that right in human society asserts itself essentially as judgment and vengeance. Thus is it when δίκη signifies lawsuit, process, or punishment, atonement, satisfaction. In the LXX. = דין, Ps. ix. 5, ἐποίησας τὴν κρίσιν μου καὶ τὴν δίκην μου, ἐκάθισας ἐπὶ θρόνον ὁ κρίνων δικαιοσύνην• = נְקָם Lev. xxvi. 25, μάχαιραἐκδικοῦσα δίκην διαθήκης; נְקָם בְּרִית. Deut. xxxii. 41, ἀποδώσω δίκην = אָשִׁיב נָקָם Ezek. xxv. 12. It is used for ריב in Job xxix. 16, Ps. xxxv. 23, where we have as its parallel מִשְׁפָּט = κρίσις.
Of the combinations usual in classical Greek in which δίκη stands with special reference to a decided (or to be decided) violation of right or of legitimate custom, there appears in the Ν. Τ. δίκην αἰτεῖν κατά τινος, Acts xxv. 15 (Lachm., καταδίκην); δικην ὑπέχειν, Jude 7, literally, to render justice, of those who suffer punishment in order to the re-establishing of the order violated by them; and δίκην τίνειν, 2 Thess. i. 10, literally, to pay the right, to atone for or make reparation, also in classical Greek something like ἀποτίνειν δίκην = to be punished.
Aristotle derives δίκη from δίχα, Eth. Nic. v. 4, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ ̓ ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ ̓ ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἣν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ ̓ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ᾷτὸ μεῖζον τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὰ αὑτῶν, ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ ̓ ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστής.
Δίκαιος, α, ον (δίκα-ιος), what is right, conformable to right, pertaining to right = just, i.e. answering to the claims of usage, custom, or right (Matt. xx. 4, 7; Col. iv. 1). It is noteworthy that the Greek δίκη, δίκαιος, the Hebrew צְדִיק, צְרַק, and the German Recht, gerecht, contain the same fundamental idea; δίκη, manner, direction; δίκαιος, what answers to manner or to its manner; צדק, according to its etymology (see Fuerst, Concord. V. T. s.v.) = rectum, planum esse, synonymous with ישר (comp. Ps. xxiii. 3 with xxvii. 11, xlv. 7); Arabic, zadaqa, erectum esse; "gerecht" – what is right, adjusted (richt), correct: comp. "zurecht weisen," to put right, in the sense of guiding or reprimanding, with the old "Recht weisen" of the judge. The fundamental idea is that of a state or condition conformable to order, apart from the consideration whether usage and custom or other factors determine the order and direction.
Thus, δίκαιος is synonymous with ἀγαθός, only that δίκαιος is a conception of a relation and presupposes a norm, whereas the subject of ἀγαθός is his own norm, so that ἀγαθός includes the predicate δίκαιος; see under ἀγαθός. Thus, δίκαιος, like ἀγαθός, may be joined, e.g., with ἵππος, βοῦς, ἅρμα, γήδιον; and while ἀγαθός in these combinations is = capable, excellent of its kind, serviceable, δίκαιος is = serviceable, answering to the claims or standards set up. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 5, φασὶν δέ τινες καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳδικαίους ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδαξόντων· ἐὰν δέ τις βούληται ἢ αὐτὸς μαθεῖν τὸ δίκαιον ἢ υἱὸν ἢ οἰκέτην διδάξασθαι, μὴ εἰδέναι ὅποι ἂν ἐλθὼν τύχοι τούτου (comp. the German gerecht = fitting, e.g., handgerecht, fussgerecht, etc.); Lucian, de Conscr. Hist. 39, συγγραφεὺς δίκαιος, a correct writer; Hippocrates, xix. 22, ἰητρὸς δίκαιος, a capable physician.
It is in keeping with the relation between δίκαιος and ἀγαθός that δίκαιος is never, like ἀγαθός, used catachrestically, never ironically applied. Comp. Plato, Rep. ii. 361, "a just man, as Aeschylus says, is one who will not seem good, but be good." As to the import of the conception in a moral sense, there is a decisive difference, not to be mistaken, between the profane, and especially the Greek, usage and the biblical; and this difference arises from the different, nay, opposite standards by which it is estimated in the two spheres. Righteousness in the biblical sense is a condition of rightness the standard of which is God, which is estimated according to the divine standard, which shows itself in behavior conformable to God, and has to do, above all things, with its relation to God, and with the walk before Him. It is, and it is called, δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (μαρτυρουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν, Rom. iii. 21), i. 17 – righteousness as it belongs to God and is of value before Him, Godlike righteousness; see Eph. iv. 24 (see under δικαιοσύνη). With this righteousness, thus defined, the gospel (Rom. i. 17) comes into that world of nations, which had been wont to measure by a different standard. Righteousness in the Scriptural sense is a thoroughly religious conception, designating the normal relation of men and their acts, etc., to God. Righteousness in the profane mind is a preponderatingly social virtue, only with a certain religious background.
With the Greeks, according to the saying of Protagoras, man is the measure of all things (Plato, Crat. 385 E, Theaet. 152 A), φησι γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν; and how greatly this influences the conception of righteousness is clear from Plato, Legg. iv. 716 C, ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶπολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις ὥς φασιν ἄνθρωπος, in which very passage an attempt is made to make way for a deeper conception without really approaching the Scripture view, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ὁ μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν θεῷ φίλος, ὅμοιος γάρ, ὁ δὲ μὴ σώφρων ἀνόμοιός τε καὶ διάφορος καὶ ἄδικος; it lacks personal relationship to God as the basis and the goal of the entire life movement and stops short with the ὅμοιος, ἀκόλουθος θεῷ.
Generally, usage and custom, the marked-out and prescribed direction or method, form the basis of right, just as δίκη denotes right as established custom and usage. Right is the sum of the historically formed relations of life as they manifest themselves in human society – a view still current in modern jurisprudence; and it need scarcely be proved how much the claims of civil society determine the conception of righteousness – take, for instance, the accusation and condemnation of Socrates. Righteousness perhaps includes a certain religious bearing, but even this with a preponderatingly social reference; comp. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 1, ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐνομίζων, with iv. 4. 13, where Socrates himself argues that that man does justly who obeys & οἱ πολῖται, συνθέμενοι ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶὧν ἀπέχεσθαι ἐγράψαντο. Granting, indeed, that the conception of righteousness is not here exhausted, but only, so to speak, the juristic side of it presented – while a deeper apprehension demands the inner personal relation to the claims of right – and Aeschylus, as above cited, says that a just man is he who will not only seem, but be good, still a closer investigation will ever more fully show that righteousness is a virtue essentially social, since right fixes the limits of individual liking, as the life of the community as a higher necessity authenticates them.