[Theses theologicae, variis temporibus in Academia Sedanensi editae et ad disputandum propositae; (London: 1683)]
Louis Le Blanc de Beaulieu (1614–1675), a faithful minister and learned professor in the Reformed churches of France, was born, according to varying accounts, either in Longvilliers near Paris or in Senlis, into a noble lineage known for its fidelity to the gospel. His family, enriched with civil dignity and ecclesiastical zeal, had long adorned the cause of Christ in France; his grandfather Étienne Le Blanc served as royal counselor and wrote piously on Christian devotion. Educated in the spirit of Geneva and Beza, Le Blanc rose early to prominence as a preacher in Sedan, a stronghold of French Huguenot piety, where he served over thirty years. In 1644, he was appointed professor of theology at the renowned Academy of Sedan, succeeding the eminent Des Marêts, and was several times rector and moderator, guiding both ecclesiastical polity and theological instruction with singular prudence. A man of profound intellect and irenic disposition, Master Le Blanc strove not only for the propagation of pure doctrine but for the peace of the visible church, even being appointed by civil magistrates, including the Marshal of Turenne, to mediate reconciliation between Protestants and Papists—though in vain. His involvement with the Synod of Alençon in 1637 as a commissioner to assess the doctrines of Amyraut and others shows the esteem in which he was held for both doctrinal precision and spiritual sobriety. As Pierre Nicole testified, he was “a precise man with a clear mind,” discerning with rare clarity the subtleties of authors and doctrinal variance. He departed this life in Sedan in 1675, leaving behind not the noise of controversy, but the fragrance of wisdom and charity, ever laboring for truth and unity in the house of God.
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Wherein is Set Forth the Doctrine of the Roman School, and Also of Those Among Protestants Who Are Singularly Called Reformed.
The Doctors of the Roman School lay as a certain and immovable foundation for this question, that in God, who is most simple, there are not many acts of will and intellect, which are the same in God with His very essence, but that God, by one most simple act, hath willed and ordained whatsoever He willed and ordained from eternity. And so, in God there are not many decrees, among which there is a true and natural order of prior and posterior. But when we consider the intellect and will of God as referred and terminated to various objects, thence are formed diverse concepts, which are called the decrees of God, and are conceived as if they were many, though that which correspondeth to them in God is in truth one.
Since, therefore, God hath willed and ordained many and diverse things concerning the ultimate end of men, and the means conducing to that end, as the acts of the divine will and intellect are referred to this end and that, and to these means and those, concerning these men and those, they are divided by the human mind into many, among which reason establisheth a certain order, according to which the human concepts of that divine act, variously considered, ought to be disposed and arranged.
And this is the whole matter which the Roman School seeketh when it disputeth concerning the order of the divine decrees with respect to the elect and the reprobate. And surely, since all agree how the matter standeth in God, to wit, as we have said, that there is only one decree in Him, in which there is no prior and posterior, it followeth that the question can only be concerning the order of human concepts, which matter seemeth almost arbitrary; since one may at his pleasure multiply those concepts and divine decrees, and besides, reason may devise various orders, according to which those concepts may be arranged, and with respect to which one decree of God is conceived now as prior, now as posterior to another.
For if one beginneth that order from the final cause, the decree concerning the object which hath the nature of an end will be conceived as prior to the decree concerning another object, which hath the nature of a means to that end. But if one rather regardeth the efficient cause and the disposing cause, then the decree concerning the means, which promote the end and dispose toward the end, will be deemed prior to the decree concerning the end. Whence it cometh that among the Doctors there is great diversity of opinions concerning this matter.
Among the ancient Scholastics, John Duns Scotus thus philosophizeth concerning this matter. According to his mind, first, God had at once before His view Peter and Judas, for example, and decreed effectually to bless Peter before He foreknew his merits; but concerning Judas, He decreed nothing of glory, but bore Himself negatively toward him. Secondly, He resolved to call Peter and to give him His grace; but toward Judas He bore Himself negatively in the same manner. Thirdly, He foresaw to permit Judas to fall into sin until the end of his life, and from those two negations posited, He foresaw him dying in sin. Fourthly, God, foreseeing the end of both, decreed to give glory to Peter, and to punish Judas with eternal torment. As Gabriel Vasquez relateth, in Volume 1, Disputation 95, Chapter 1, where he testifieth that many recent writers follow Scotus’ opinion in this matter. Yet some add, as Corduba and Diego Alvarez, that God, in that first instant, before any works were foreseen, decreed not indeed to punish Judas with the pain of sense, but to deny him blessedness and glory.