[Syntagma sacrae theologiae: quatuor libris adornatum pro conditione ecclesiae Sardensis; Bremen, 1636]
Ludwig Crocius, born at Laasphe on the 29th day of March in the Year of Our Lord 1586, was a faithful minister and scholar of the Calvinistic persuasion. Son of Paul Crocius, he early gave proof of his aptitude for learning, serving as tutor to the young nobility of Nassau-Dillenburg and Wittgenstein-Berleburg, and succeeding his father in 1607 as preacher and inspector of Katzenelnbogen. He pursued his studies with diligence at the Herborn Academy and the University of Marburg, attaining his M.A. in 1604, and afterwards his Doctorate of Divinity at Basel in April 1609. Returning thence to Bremen, he was appointed first preacher of St. Martini’s and Professor of Philosophy and Theology at the Gymnasium Illustre, offices which he sustained with piety and learning until his final summons in December 1653 (some record 1655). At the celebrated Synod of Dort (1618–19), Crocius stood with Mathias Martinius in a tempered defence of Melanchthonian moderation, manifesting sympathy toward the Remonstrants and publicly rebuking the severity of the chair, yet subscribing to the Canons for prudential conformity. His scholarly temper led him into controversy with Balthasar Mentzer in 1621 and later with Hendrik Alting in 1640, wherein John Davenant and Joseph Hall vindicated his reputation. Esteemed for toleration and peace-making, he penned numerous works—among them the magisterial Syntagma sacrae Theologiae (1636) and the pedagogical Antisocinismus Contractus (1639). Throughout his life, Crocius exhibited a conciliatory spirit, uniting erudition and charity to the edification of Christ’s church.
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And thus concerning the means of our salvation external: there followeth the internal, namely FAITH, which is a trusting sense and recognition of the truth, which is according to godliness in hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the times of the world, and hath manifested in His own times.
The order which we follow demandeth that we here treat of faith, as it appeareth from chapter 7, aphorism 1 of this book, wherein we have so distinguished the means of salvation. The Apostle supplieth this definition of faith in Titus 1, verse 1 and following, and calleth this faith the faith of the elect, both for that it is common unto the elect, and for that it pertaineth unto the common salvation, as Jude loveth to speak in verse 3. And unto this also may be referred the Apostolic description of the same, Hebrews 11, verse 1, which, albeit it expresseth the object of faith with words only more general, nevertheless doth sufficiently and emphatically declare the properties and effects of faith and the office thereof in this manner: Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. Where the common interpreter turneth hypostasis into substance, which it properly signifieth, or subsistence, as in Hebrews 1, verse 3, it is sometime taken for boldness, fortitude, and presence of mind. The Apostle also useth it so in Hebrews 11, verse 1, and expoundeth it in verse 6 by confidence. The Seventy interpreters in the Old Testament render from the Hebrew yāqam, which is standing and firm confidence, Psalm 69, verse 3. Then elenchus, that is, demonstration, argument, conviction, and in the sacred writings it is oft used for the reproof of them that contradict and sin, 1 Timothy 3, verse 16; Titus 1, verse 9; Ephesians 5, verse 13; unto which in Hebrew answereth tokhechah, that is, reproof, correction, which the Seventy have almost ever rendered by elenchos, Proverbs 6, verse 23, and chapter 29, verse 15. Thirdly, by the word “things hoped for,” without doubt is denoted the object of hope, which also is common unto faith. And this object of hope is both that which is hoped for, as eternal life, and that in which it is hoped, as God, Psalm 71, verse 5; Jeremiah 17, verse 13; Christ, Colossians 1, verse 27; 1 Timothy 1, verse 1. And hereunto pertain not only good things to come, though these most properly, but also things present, yea, and things past, which we believe to have been done and trust shall endure, which are sometime said to be hoped for, 2 Corinthians 3, verse 11. Forasmuch as something also is believed which is not hoped for, as Augustine showeth in his Enchiridion, chapter 8. The Apostle addeth also “things not seen.” For many things which are not seen be of such condition that it pertaineth not either to be demonstrated or reproved, but those only whose manifestation may pertain unto the faith of things to be hoped for, which afore were named, and wherein is the perfection of faith, to be nourished, strengthened, and exercised.
Furthermore, the word “faith” is taken in sundry significations. For first, faith is called all truth in speaking, albeit it promiseth naught, and that indeed by synecdoche. Whence things are said to be related and alleged in good faith, which are related and alleged out of truth. Secondly, so is called the promise itself, for the which we are said to give faith, either by synecdoche or by analogy of attribution, 2 Timothy 2, verse 12. Thirdly, the authority of the promiser, whereby he deserveth faith among others, which is a certain causal respect adhering unto the virtue of him that faithfully speaketh and promiseth; and this by metonymy of the subject, or analogy of attribution, we say “to follow another.” And in this sense the poet saith: *As much as each one keepeth his coins in his chest, so much hath he of faith.*Fourthly, assent, which we yield unto the speaker by metonymy of the object, which signification hath so prevailed that it is almost held as proper, and least of all yieldeth unto that which floweth from the first imposition. In this signification it is here taken by us for assent, insofar as it answereth unto the authority of God, whose faith and truth we follow, and the assent which we yield includeth worship and reverence, and credulity, Romans 4, verse 20. But this assent is to be limited both from its principle and foundation wherefore we assent, and from the manner and degree of certainty. The principle, for the which we assent, is either the evidence or manifest truth of the thing itself, or the verisimilitude of the thing, or probability and appearance of any kind, or the authority of him that testifieth concerning a thing, which yet itself may have either some evidence of its own or only probability. The evidence of the thing itself is known either by sense, and so we are said rather to see than to believe, or by the intellect, when either we know principles known by nature, or conclusions which are drawn out of other manifest principles by necessary consequence. And this knowledge and assent some would rather call a certain intrinsic vision than faith. But the verisimilitude of the thing, and likewise the authority of testimony, be it only probable or be it authentic, admitteth doubt or some deliberation, nor doth it obtain as the evidence of the thing, which necessarily effecteth assent without other requirement, but bringeth assent in the knower by some inclination of the will. Moreover, the assent which followeth not the evidence of the thing, but appearance and probability howsoever, is commonly called opinion, which is true when we judge that which is probable to be verily such. But it is erroneous when we judge that which is false to be probable, or that which is either naught or only probable to be evidently true. Therefore faith, first, is not of external vision. For it is of things hoped for, which we see not, Hebrews 11, verse 1; but either when they now be, we certainly establish them to endure for our good, or that they shall sometime be, albeit they appear not unto the senses, Romans 8, verses 24 and 25. Secondly, neither is it of internal vision perfectly so called. For albeit we be said to see some invisible things through faith, 2 Corinthians 4, verse 18, yet it is in part and a vision through a glass, 1 Corinthians 13, verse 12. Thirdly, nor is it from the evidence of the thing, so that the nature of the thing itself impelleth the intellect of all that think, or at least of most, to assent; but from the inclination and election of the will, as Thomas Aquinas explaineth in the second part, question 1, article 2, and therefore from reverence for the speaking God, which is of few, not of all, 2 Corinthians 2, verses 9 and 10; 2 Thessalonians 3, verse 2. For we judge those things to be true which reason, taken from the thing, could rather persuade to be false or uncertain, Romans 4, verse 18 and following; Hebrews 11, verses 19 and 26. Which inclination of the mind and reverence toward the speaker not only Bellarmine, in book 6 On Grace and Free Will, chapter 3, hath as a pious affection and for a third condition of the act of faith, but also Calvin, in book 3 of the Institutes, sections 4, 5-8, calleth a pious affection. By which pious affection we must watch righteously, lest we be numbered among sinners and them that know not God, 1 Corinthians 15, verse 34. See Galatians 4, verse 8; 1 Thessalonians 1, verse 9; John 7, verse 3 and 17; Hebrews 11, verse 6. For even as the truth and faith of God, which we follow by believing, includeth the doctrine revealed and the virtue to be honoured in the revealer, so also the faith whereby we follow His authority includeth knowledge and an honouring affection in the believer, whereby he giveth glory unto God, Romans 4, verse 20. Fourthly, yet it is not mere opinion, probable only concerning probable things. For it is hypostasis and conviction, Hebrews 11, verse 1. Fifthly, much less is it error. For we believe not cunningly devised fables, 2 Peter 1, verse 16. Sixthly, but it is assent concerning such truth properly, which not the reason of the thing said, but the authority of the speaker persuadeth. For Augustine saith well in his book On the Utility of Believing, chapter 11: “What we understand,” saith he, “we owe unto reason; what we believe, unto authority.” And thus this assent is explained from its principle, which is the authority of the speaker; which, if it be human, bringeth forth human faith; but if divine, divine faith, and therefore that whereof we here treat. It may also be distinguished from the manner and degree of certainty, so that there be seven degrees of human assent, whereof the first is doubt, when our intellect inclineth to assent unto neither part; the second is suspicion, when our intellect declineth unto one part, but is held by a light sign only; the third is opinion, when it adhereth indeed unto one part, but with fear of the opposite; the fourth is faith; the fifth is knowledge; the sixth is understanding; the seventh is sensation, when we adhere unto one part without fear of the opposite, either for that the authority of the speaker is unto us irrefragable, or for that it is concluded necessarily from a cause, or for that the thing is evident in itself, or for that it is obvious unto the sense well-constituted. And here faith regularly holdeth the middle place between doubt, suspicion, and opinion on the one part, and between knowledge, understanding, and sensation on the other part, and it is firmer than opinion, suspicion, and doubt, but weaker than vision perfect. Albeit yet the act of faith in the pious, in time of temptations, is not rarely cast down beneath opinion, and in changed intervals may be elevated above the certainty of knowledge. But from the things said, two things especially come to be decided.
The Papists indeed deny it. For by knowledge they understand knowledge acquired through demonstration, or the demonstrative habit, as the philosophers speak. But that faith be not such knowledge, we also with a large hand concede unto them. Yet knowledge cometh not only under the name of the cognition of why and how a thing is, but also of the cognition that a thing is, as is manifest from 1 John 3, verse 2; Isaiah 53, verse 11; John 17, verse 3 and following. And this is altogether required in faith, as Pareus witnesseth against Bellarmine in On Justification, chapter 4. And unto this extent it is gnosis. Yet our theologians, even as they be oft compelled to impugn some thesis or phrase of the adversaries for the abuses born thereof, which in itself and absolutely considered might be conceded, so here they strenuously urge knowledge against them, to show: First, that no dogma is properly believed whereof thou hast not first heard not only the premises or principles, but even the conclusion itself, Romans 10, verse 14; Hebrews 11, verses 3 and 6; Acts 20, verse 27; lest, to wit, the Papists obtain that there be very many propositions of faith which one implicitly indeed, but truly, believeth, though never heard, if he confess that whatsoever the Pope and the Roman Church believe is true. Whence further, as pertaineth unto the modesty of believing, it is twisted into a laziness of inquiring. Secondly, that they may teach that, even as in natural things no proposition is properly known or understood unless the evidence of the thing be sufficiently disclosed, so in sacred things no proposition is rightly believed unless in a just manner the evidence and authority of the testimony be disclosed, for which assent is required.
The Papists also deny this, for that trust is in the will, but faith is a certain inchoate vision, unto which vision face to face shall succeed. But we see not with the will, but with the intellect. Yet it sufficeth for us that trust is included by faith as part of the difference, which in accidents is taken not from the subject alone, and therefore pertaineth unto the definition of faith. Whence also Pareus, in the appendix of book 1On Justification, chapter 4, against Bellarmine, compendiously defineth faith as fiducial assent. Whence we easily concede that the habit of faith, insofar as it noteth assent, is in the intellect as in the subject; but insofar as it also includeth a pious affection, not even the Papists themselves will deny that it is in the will. Especially since Thomas Aquinas expressly confesseth that the act of believing, as such an act of virtue, ought to proceed from twain active principles, to wit, the will and the intellect, in which will therefore the habit also is presupposed.
We consider here the object of faith, the mode or form, the opposites, and the consequences.
The object of Christian faith is either more broadly or more commonly, or more definitely or more determinately, whereof the former is called material, the latter formal, and each is either directly or per se, or indirectly or per accidens the object.
IV. Commonly taken, the object of faith is both to whom it is believed and what is believed. The former may be called personal, the latter real.