[De Scripturarum interprete adversus exercitatorem paradoxum libri duo; (Apud Johannem Ribbium, 1668)]
Ludwig Wolzogen (1633–1690), that learned and pious Doctor of sacred theology, was born in the city of Amersfoort within the bounds of the Dutch Republic, in the year of our Lord 1633. Descended from the illustrious house of Wolzogen, and son to the renowned Johann Ludwig von Wolzogen, he was early trained up in the fear of God and in the rudiments of good letters. Advancing in years, he was called by Providence to labor in the service of the Reformed Churches, and became a faithful minister and distinguished professor in the academies of the United Provinces. He first adorned the chair of philosophy and theology at the University of Groningen (1660–1663), where his doctrine was sound and his manner grave, ever striving to expound the oracles of God with purity and learned diligence. From thence he was summoned to Utrecht University (1664–1670), and lastly to the Athenaeum Illustre of Amsterdam (1670–1690), where he continued, until his decease, to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints. A man of singular prudence, gravity, and godly conversation, Wolzogen remained constant in the doctrine of the Reformed Church, opposing all innovations contrary to the truth of the Gospel. His labours in the service of Christ’s Church were many, and his legacy abideth among the sons of the prophets. He entered into his rest at Amsterdam, November 13, 1690, having finished his course in faith and hope.
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Against the Philosophical Paradox: A Confutation of Rationalist Hermeneutics
Hitherto we may seem only to have fortified our camp, drawn up ramparts, disposed our defenses, and provided with no little care for all those things which were required for the defense of our opinion. Now it is time that we move against the enemy; whom, however, there is no need to provoke in the manner of skirmishers with a running fight, as if he were sluggish and hesitating. He demands battle of his own accord, and impatient of delay, desires to engage hand to hand and with joined foot, about to make trial of his strength. We shall gratify him in this, and shall not unwillingly commit that pitched battle which he so greatly desires.
Although justice and right would seem to demand that at least the cause of this Scriptural war, which the spirited Exercitator has undertaken with such ardor, should be known on both sides. For either he does not understand it clearly, or Our Author does not explain it clearly enough.
He does indeed rightly and properly observe at the very beginning of the first chapter that the cause is immense, and one which involves the dissensions and contentions of all those who stand by the judgment of the Scriptures. For all questions concerning the interpretation of the Scriptures are agitated among them.
But in composing those dissensions, I could have wished that he had defined for us with somewhat more accurate judgment what kind of Interpreter he seeks. For there is not one kind of Interpreter of the Scriptures. One must be held who interprets them for others, another who renders this service for himself alone.
The Author joins both together, and everywhere, making no distinction, boasts that his Interpreter can both draw out meanings and indicate them. What could be said more alien by an accurate disputant?
He wishes the divided members of torn Christianity to be united: what does a private Interpreter contribute to this, who, secure concerning others, consults only for himself? He sets down those conditions of an Interpreter which have certain and invincible persuasion: what public Interpreter assumes this command over the minds of others?
Whichever Interpreter he chooses, as he indeed disputes, he will have him imperfect: in one he will not attain his end, because he is unfit for composing dissensions in religion; in the other he will not find the necessary gifts for the performance of his office, because he will not have what he calls infallibility.
But if it had altogether pleased him to couple both Interpreters in the same disputation, with those conditions dismissed and the scope which he set before himself abandoned, he could thus have inquired what was chiefly that thing by which one who used reason could and ought to be led to allow himself to be persuaded of the truth of some interpretation.
For both he who is an Interpreter for himself is moved by some certain reason, and he who serves others can apply the same reason—not indeed so that they are actually convinced (for who can bend the stubborn and untamed mind of others, or one occupied with preconceived opinions, or one foolish and without experience of reason, according to his own pleasure?), but so that it may be known that they ought to have been convinced by the force of the reason brought forward, if they had contracted no fault themselves.
But that Interpreter who makes certain and invincible faith for others, I deny exists or ever existed, I deny ought to exist, I deny can exist. See now, imprudent man, to what vanity all your Exercitation is reduced, in which you seek with such great labor what you will never find!