[The Common Places]
Peter Martyr Vermigli—born Piero Mariano Vermigli at Florence, 8 Sept 1499—was a vessel fashioned of Providence for the furtherance of Gospel light. Nurtured amid Tuscan splendor, he entered the Canons Regular of the Lateran and, at Padua, drank deeply of Aristotle and Aquinas, adding to these the tongues of Greece and Zion. Yet while he pored over the Fathers—especially blessed Augustine—he perceived that justifying righteousness is imputed by faith alone, not infused by sacramental artifice (Rom 3:28). Conscience, chafing beneath the Roman yoke, urged flight; and in 1542 he forsook Lucca for Strasbourg, that he might preach Christ without the fetters of popish tradition. Thereafter he served thrice‑notably: in Strasbourg with Bucer, in Oxford under Cranmer, and in Zürich beside Bullinger. Wherever he taught, he wed exact philology to sound doctrine, expounding Holy Writ with a lucid brevity seldom equalled. His Loci Communes distilled these labors into orderly heads, furnishing the Reformed churches with a scholastic armory against both papal transubstantiation and Lutheran ubiquity. In predestination he echoed the potent decree of Eph 1:11, yet held reprobation a passing‑by rather than an equal act with election. Having endured manifold exile for the truth’s sake, he fell asleep at Zürich, 12 Nov 1562, commended by Josias Simler as “integritas et pietas incarnata.” Thus ended the earthly pilgrimage of a faithful divine whose pen and pulpit still instruct the sons of the Reformation.
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Now it shall be meet to entreat somewhat of the liberty of our will. And at this present, we will inquire how much free will the natural corruption, which came by original sin, hath left unto us: especially, seeing whatsoever we do well, all that is said to be attributed unto the grace of God. And although this term Free Will be not read in the holy scriptures, yet the thing itself must not seem to be either imagined or devised. The Greeks call it αὐτεξούσιον, which is, Of his own power, or, Of his own right: the which same thing the Latins signify when they call it Libertatem arbitrii, that is, The liberty or the choice of will. For that is free which followeth not the will of another, but his own will. But the choice seemeth herein to consist, that we follow, as we think good, those things which be decreed by reason. Then doubtless the will is free when it embraceth those things which be allowed of the considering part of the mind. Wherefore the nature of free choice, although it doth most of all declare itself in the will, yet doth the root thereof consist in reason. But they which will use this power aright must have a special regard, that no error fall into reason. Which error commonly is wont to come two manner of ways: for either it is unknown to us what is just and what is unjust in the doings of things; or else, if we do know it, yet we fail in giving judgement of the reasons which are wont to be alleged on both parts. For ever, in a manner, our lust joineth itself unto the weaker argument. Whereof it cometh to pass oftentimes, that the stronger and the better reason is neglected and forsaken.
And this we see doth oftentimes happen in disputations: for they which take upon them to defend the weaker part are wont to set a show upon the same, with all the ornaments and colours that they can, to the intent the hearers, being allured with eloquence and counterfeit speech, may not throughly weigh wherein the strength and weight of the argument doth consist. Moreover, it is to be understood that men do not commonly deliberate concerning all manner of things, but of those only which of the Greeks be called πρακτά, that is, Which are to be done of us. And in very deed, all the things which either we prosecute or refuse have not need of deliberation: for there be some things so manifest and undoubtedly good [or evil] as it sufficeth that they be named; for they be forthwith either chosen or refused: such are felicity, infelicity, life, death, and whatsoever is of the like sort. But there be certain other more obscure or indifferent, upon which things men are wont to deliberate. That God is to be worshipped, all men confess without any doubting; but after what manner, and with what rites and ceremonies he must be worshipped, therein is great doubt. That it is profitable for men to be together in cities, and to maintain fellowship, all men do know: but by what laws they must be ruled, or what kind of commonwealth ought to be used, there men many times do doubt very much. In these, and such other like things, is free will occupied.
I define free will after this sort: Free will is a faculty or power whereby we either take or refuse, as we list ourselves, those things which be judged by reason. But whether such a kind of power be in men or no, or how it is in them, cannot with one answer be defined.
First, we must of necessity distinguish the state and condition of man. There be verily found in man four differences of state at the least: for the state of Adam, when he was created in the beginning, was far differing from the state after his fall; such as is now also the state of all his posterity. Moreover, they which be regenerated in Christ be in far better state than they which live without Christ; for we shall become most happy and most free when we have put off this mortal body: wherefore we will make answer unto the proposed question according to these four states.
We must believe that Adam, in his first creation, had free will: which thing, before I shall declare, three kinds of works that be in us are to be noted. Of the which, some do appertain unto nature, as to be sick, to be in health, to be nourished, to digest our meat, and such other like: in the which things, albeit the first man was a great deal more happy than we be at this present, yet he was subject unto some necessity: for it behoved him both to eat, to be nourished, and to take meat. Nevertheless, he was free from all calamities which might bring death. There are other works also which, after a civil or moral consideration, be either just or unjust. The third kind is of those works which be liking and acceptable to God. As concerning all these, man was free from the beginning: for he was created unto the image of God, unto whom nothing doth better agree than true and perfect liberty. And of him it is thus written: God hath crowned him with glory and honour: and again, When he was in honour, he knew it not. And what honour can there be where liberty wanteth? Lastly, God made subject unto him all things which he had created: the which, out of doubt, he could not truly and according to right reason have governed, if he himself had been created a slave unto affections and lusts. But in what sort that state was, seeing there wanteth scripture to show us, there can nothing be defined for certainty.
Augustine, in his book De correptione et gratia, saith that the help of the grace of God was bestowed upon Adam: and such a help it was, as both he might forsake it when he would, and therein might remain if he would; but not that it should be as he would. And as touching this thing, Augustine dareth prefer the grace which we enjoy by Christ above that grace which Adam had in paradise: for now, by the grace of Christ, not only we abide if we will, but also (as Paul saith) We have both to will and to perform: for the heart of believers is changed, so as of not willing, they be made willing. And this same To will was in the very choice of the first man, neither was it the grace of God that wrought this in him. But why God gave free will unto Adam in his first creation, Augustine bringeth this reason, in his second book De libero arbitrio: for that God had decreed to declare unto him both his goodness and his justice. And he would have declared towards him his goodness if he had done well; which thing undoubtedly he could not have done if he had not been free. But if so be he should behave himself dishonestly and naughtily, God was to use towards him the severity of his justice.