[Tractationes theologicae; (Geneva, 1570)]

Theodore Beza, born on June 24, 1519, in Vézelay, France, was a distinguished theologian, scholar, and reformer of the Protestant Reformation. Educated under the humanist Melchior Wolmar, Beza initially pursued law but later embraced the Reformed faith, leading to his exile from France. In 1548, he settled in Geneva, where he became a close associate of John Calvin. Beza's contributions were manifold. He served as a professor of Greek at the Academy of Lausanne and later at the Geneva Academy, where he succeeded Calvin as the chair of theology. His leadership extended to the Company of Pastors in Geneva, where he played a pivotal role in shaping Reformed theology and church governance. A prolific writer, Beza authored several significant works. His De jure magistratuum (1574) defended the rights of magistrates against tyranny, and his editions of the Greek New Testament were instrumental in biblical scholarship. Beza also penned a biography of Calvin and contributed to the Genevan Psalter, enhancing the liturgical life of the Reformed churches. Throughout his life, Beza was actively involved in theological debates, notably defending the doctrine of predestination and engaging in dialogues with Lutheran theologians. His efforts were crucial in consolidating the Reformed tradition during a period of religious upheaval. Beza passed away on October 13, 1605, in Geneva, leaving behind a legacy as a steadfast guardian of Reformed orthodoxy and a key figure in the Protestant Reformation.

Theodore Beza, born on June 24, 1519, in Vézelay, France, was a distinguished theologian, scholar, and reformer of the Protestant Reformation. Educated under the humanist Melchior Wolmar, Beza initially pursued law but later embraced the Reformed faith, leading to his exile from France. In 1548, he settled in Geneva, where he became a close associate of John Calvin. Beza's contributions were manifold. He served as a professor of Greek at the Academy of Lausanne and later at the Geneva Academy, where he succeeded Calvin as the chair of theology. His leadership extended to the Company of Pastors in Geneva, where he played a pivotal role in shaping Reformed theology and church governance. A prolific writer, Beza authored several significant works. His De jure magistratuum (1574) defended the rights of magistrates against tyranny, and his editions of the Greek New Testament were instrumental in biblical scholarship. Beza also penned a biography of Calvin and contributed to the Genevan Psalter, enhancing the liturgical life of the Reformed churches. Throughout his life, Beza was actively involved in theological debates, notably defending the doctrine of predestination and engaging in dialogues with Lutheran theologians. His efforts were crucial in consolidating the Reformed tradition during a period of religious upheaval. Beza passed away on October 13, 1605, in Geneva, leaving behind a legacy as a steadfast guardian of Reformed orthodoxy and a key figure in the Protestant Reformation.

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CONCERNING the Hypostatic Union of the Two Natures in Christ

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Against the Assertion of Jacob Andreae to the Most Illustrious Duke Christopher, Duke of Württemberg, Count of Montbéliard, etc.

A certain two-day response of Jacob Andreae, Most Illustrious Prince, compelleth me again to be troublesome to Thy Highness concerning the same matter. For he, with such promptitude of tongue, not waiting for the publication of my entire book, hath responded in two days to three pages thereof: so that he hath passed over certain arguments of the greatest moment, hath increased certain Brentian errors, and finally hath imputed to me certain things of which I never thought: which three things I have determined to declare in few words, that at length the darkness of errors may be dispersed by the brightness of truth.

THE QUESTION is what is the hypostatic union of the two natures, which Brentius and Andreae explain one way, and we again define another way from the authority of the Word of God, as we judge, and the decree of the orthodox Council of Chalcedon.

THE BRENTIAN opinion, therefore, is this in summary. To UNITE the divine nature with the human, taken simply, declareth the same as to fill it with its essence, and moreover to confer something upon it, insomuch indeed that all men in their own manner consist of these two natures inseparably united as long as the compound endureth: but to UNITE PERSONALLY those two natures in Christ, signifieth the same as for the assuming nature, namely the divine, not only to fill the assumed human nature with its essence, as other men, and even any creature whatsoever, and to confer certain gifts upon it, but also moreover to adorn it with all, all, I say, divine gifts, and especially omnipresence. Finally, if we believe Brentius, the essential union of the divine and human nature is common to Christ with all men, in whom it is also energetic, but only in some measure. But the Personal union, which is proper to Christ alone, is nothing else than the most perfect energy of Divinity, such indeed, that whatsoever the Divinity hath by nature and essentially, the humanity hath in itself by grace, and by accident.

THIS DOGMA I have accused before all the Churches, and still do accuse, as compounded of two blasphemies which are even repugnant to each other, those of Nestorius and Eutyches. For it is Nestorian in this, that Christ in this manner, as far as concerneth the divine nature, is established to be God no differently from other men, and therefore is manifestly dissolved into two hypostases or persons. But it is an Eutychian delusion to think all the properties of Divinity bestowed upon humanity, or (as Brentius also speaketh) poured into it.

WHICH BOTH I have demonstrated both in these immediately following and also in other arguments.

First Argument: GOD the Father and the Holy Spirit fill all things, yet are they united essentially with no thing, much less personally. Therefore, for the divine nature to unite itself with something, so that it may be said in any manner to consist of the divine nature and another proper to itself, is far different from filling something with its essence. The antecedent is proved, because if created things consisted in some measure of the divine nature, to that extent they would be said to be of the same essence with God, which nevertheless belongeth to the one person of Christ, and that in respect of the Word alone, being substantially united with the assumed nature in Christ alone.

BUT TO this argument Andreae thus respondeth, It is to be wondered at, saith he, in Beza, that he reproveth Brentius, who saith that the human nature even outside the humanity of Christ, is united to men, and indeed inseparably united to certain ones.

BUT I wonder, Andreae, how it hath come to pass that what Brentius everywhere inculcateth concerning any men whatsoever, and indeed concerning any thing, and what thou thyself extendest even to rocks in this very Assertion of thine, thou dost in this place restrict to certain ones only, namely to the Saints, in whom also thou manifestly confoundest PRESENCE WITH UNION.

ANDREAE ADDETH afterward, Let Beza hear in turn what Christ prayed, The glory, saith he, which thou hast given me I have given to them, that they may be one as we are one: I in them, and thou in me. Doth Christ also seem to thee to have spoken improperly?

BY NO MEANS, but what Christ said concerning the bond of will and charity, thou unskilfully accommodatest to the union of the substance itself. Then if that were true which thou wouldst prove by this testimony (unless perchance thou hast forgotten the question proposed), why would Christ demand that to be given to his own which would belong to all creatures?

Second Argument: A DEMON filleth a demoniac with its substance, and indeed with the greatest energy, yet it is not united with him. Therefore, to fill another with one's substance even with efficacy, is far different from being united according to nature: which argument Luther himself useth, as I have declared in my book with his testimony adduced.

ANDREAE RESPONDETH, this example is very absurd: for, saith he, a demon doth not so join itself to a man, that it is united with the man in this manner, but rather that it may afflict and tear him.

BUT THIS is not to solve the argument. For we ask not why it is united, but whether it is united. But if thy doctrine were true, a different or even contrary end of union would not hinder but that a demon might deservedly be said to be united with a demoniac according to nature. Therefore Luther speaketh much more correctly, who placeth this difference in the thing itself, that is, in that the devil cannot become man. From which it followeth that the natures are not united, and consequently it is far different to fill something with one's substance being present, than to be united according to nature or substance.

THEREFORE Andreae added, Yet no man of understanding will deny that a demon and a man are in their way said to be one, even if thou callest this union neither essential nor personal, in which manner Christ said, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?